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  Mary Wiseman

Introduction
Laurent Stern casts his net wide in this careful and probing
analysis of a rational activity that we begin to practice in
kindergarten. He does not address the question of whether
interpretive reasoning is different in kind from reasoning that is
deductive, inductive, practical, or moral, however, because his
interest lies not in mapping the geography of our kinds of
rational activity but in the formulation and justification of the
principles we use in making interpretations, whose objects are,
he claims, actions and speech acts. This means that when we
interpret laws, texts, works of art, and other human
productions, we are construing them in terms of the activities
that produced them. The product is the record of the act of
producing it. It is a record of the intention with which
legislators, writers, or artists act, so long, that is, that they
were successful in realizing their intentions. We want to know
what they did, why, how, and with what materials. We
interpret, Stern claims, only when we do not understand what
another said or did; our goal in interpreting is to make sense
of the words or deeds. There is no single answer to the
question of when interpretation is called for just because some
people set the bar for an adequate understanding higher than
others, and some circumstances require a deeper
understanding of what was said or done than others do. Even
so, there are principles in play when we do interpret, and it is
these that Stern sets out to capture.
I am going to look at three issues that might at first seem
peripheral to Stern’s central enterprise. The first looks at the
difference between speaking with an individual voice and
letting one’s interpretations be influenced by what Stern calls
“private conditions.” Here he makes a significant contribution
to the literature on interpretation. The second looks at his
characterization of the conditions under which we must
interpret what another says or does; this raises the matter of
the points of view from which an interpreter can regard what
was said or done, her own or that of the speaker or agent or
of any rational person. Here I find what Stern says to be
curiously incomplete. The third asks the difference between
interpreting what people say and do and interpreting works of
art. I suspect that art interpretations, like Kant’s aesthetic
judgments, are pure in a way that their practical cousins are
not and that a study of how we make them is more central to
the enterprise of mapping our interpretive principles than
Stern might allow.
Interpretive Reasoning is for the most part an account of the
ways speakers go wrong when what they say jars with the
facts, and it calls them to account when they are blameworthy
for being wrong, that is, when they are self-deceived and
“should have known better.” It also calls interpreters to
account when, in the name of being tolerant of interpretations
incompatible with their own, they are insincere or hypocritical,
both modes of lying. Here Stern addresses the moral

dimension of practical interpretation, and this address is one of
the gems of the book. He is suspicious of interpreters, citing
again and again circumstances in which an interpreter defends
her interpretation by citing the Restrictive Principle “Only
reasonable persons who are familiar with the circumstances
understand what is at issue the way I do,” (10) when what
she would really like to cite or what she really means is the
Universalizability Principle, “Every reasonable person who is
familiar with the circumstances understands what is at issue
the way I do.”(9) Such insincerity is rife in the universe of
discourse as Stern parses it, which is itself rife with
interpretation.
Before we enter a land where there may be lies, selfdeception, insincerity, and hypocrisy, let us ask of those who
speak and act, “Who is speaking or who is acting?”
1. Private Conditions and Individual Voices
“We must have a standard of correctness for our
interpretations if we wish to avoid the major pitfall of
interpreting: the projections of our own beliefs, desires, and
understanding of what is at issue onto the object of
interpretation.”(203) (Emphasis added.) Such projections
imperil all our efforts to understand others, including words
and actions we think we understand and do not need to
interpret. The pitfall consists in subjecting the object under
interpretation to conditions private to the interpreter, reducing
it to a screen for the projection of her own beliefs and desires.
We are here at the nub of a matter dear to Stern: the
difference between not allowing oneself to be influenced by
such private conditions, on the one hand, and speaking with
one’s own voice, on the other. He says “No” to private
conditions and “Yes” to individual voices. One difference
between the two appears in the catalogue of conditions an
interpretation has to satisfy in order to justify its interpreter in
demanding agreement from everyone else. Speaking with an
individual voice is not among them, whereas not structuring
the object to be interpreted in line with the configuration of
the interpreter’s private mental attitudes is. A lot of weight is
put on the notion of the private: it is true, though not
definitive, of a mental attitude or event’s being private that its
subject cannot reasonably expect other reasonable people to
share it.
The conditions whose satisfaction allows an interpreter to
demand agreement fall first of all on the interpreter. They are
three: the interpreter must not project herself onto the
interpretandum, must make the interpretation consistent with
the facts; and must choose the best available interpretation of
those facts. My voice is my own when it has grown out of the
experiences of my life and when it sounds only what I have
myself accepted, not what I have merely borrowed from
another person or group. The kinds of consensus most apt to
skew an interpretation are those formed within a group
defined by its special interests, feminist or Marxist say, or by
its interpreter’s commitment to a political party or
philosophical theory.
The importance of having an individual voice comes to the fore
in discussion of the interpretation of works of art and
philosophy, distinguished by Stern from law, science, and

religion in that interpretations in the latter fields are
application-driven, while those in art and philosophy are
principle-driven. Stern might seem to ignore this distinction
when, having said that understanding is the goal of
interpreting, he goes on to say that “Our understanding of
what others have said and done is guided by its application to
a given purpose. Interpretations are application-driven.” (68)
I take it that here Stern means that the interpreter assumes
the purposefulness of the words or deeds he is trying to make
sense of and that his interpretation has to fit that purpose.
There is a narrower sense of “application” in which the sense
that an application-driven interpretation makes of its object
has to be such that the law, scientific hypothesis, or religious
law to be interpreted can be applied to a particular case. The
need to apply the law or hypothesis is usually what called for
the interpretation in the first place. Gone is the luxury of
entertaining various interpretations to see what can be made
of the work under interpretation, a strategy helpful in exploring
and exploiting the depths of works of art and philosophy.
The individual voice comes to the fore in art and philosophy
because the job of the art critic and the philosopher is
precisely to give voice not only to what they have accepted as
their own, but also, in the best case, to what is new. Many
people can say the same thing with their own voices, but the
creative critic and philosopher, like the creative artist and
scientist, see and say something that no one else has seen or
said. Where is interpreting here? The critic interprets the
artwork. In Stern’s words, this is to bestow meaning on it.
The philosopher solves a problem by making a different sense
of it from has already been made by interpreting it in a
different way. The individuality of the individual voice is what
stands out: it says what no one has yet said. There are
innovators in law, science, and religion as well, but the
practice of the three disciplines consists in large part of
applying their laws, whereas the practices of criticism and
philosophy consist in canvassing possible ways of seeing and
framing their objects rather than in finding a fit between them
and theories of criticism or philosophy.
Interpreting with one’s own voice is not, however, a necessary
condition for making a good interpretation. Suppose someone
comes up with an interpretive hypothesis about something
said that fits the facts, which are facts about the speaker’s
state of mind (he is sincere and not self-deceived) and the
world, and I judge the hypothesis to be trustworthy. Suppose
further that I judge it to be free of the projection of its
framer’s beliefs and desires and to be the best available. I can
accept it as mine even though it is not original with me. And
if I do accept it, we can say that it is the interpretation I
would have made had I known everything about the
interpreted object that its interpreter did and had he not
gotten there first. I have not borrowed the voice of the other;
I have borrowed what he said. If originality is all that is
foregone in borrowing another’s interpretation, then using a
ready-made interpretation does no injustice to the interpreter
or the interpretandum so long as what was borrowed satisfies
the three conditions.
It is not always permissible to borrow interpretations,
however. Consider the case of a doctrinaire feminist who

tends to see much of what is said and done in terms of the
patriarchal oppression of women and whose interpretations are
made from the point of view of radical feminism. We are
inclined to say that her voice is not her own but feminism’s.
Feminist interpretations are at risk of blanketing the objects to
be interpreted with beliefs, desires, and understandings that
are private (belong uniquely) to the movement and of
anchoring the interpretations to a simulacrum of the object
under interpretation. If one accepts the beliefs and desires to
which feminism gives rise just because she is sympathetic to
feminism’s goals and not because she has worked them out for
herself, we do not say that she is using her own voice to say
what feminism says. We say instead that she is speaking with
feminism’s voice. Suppose, for example, one interprets the
painting of a female nude as the object of male desire not
because one has found evidence for this through careful study
of the painting but because one assumes that since some
paintings of female nudes are objects for the male gaze, all
must be, men being what they are. Such an interpretation is
not justified because she has obscured the object with an
overlay of feminist dicta.
One can be a feminist and make feminist interpretations in her
own voice, however. This would be someone who works
through the feminist theory-generated propositions that guide
the beliefs and desires of its adherents and assesses the
evidence for them. If, then, she judges that certain of the
propositions are true of an object to be interpreted and uses
them in making the interpretation, she is speaking with her
own and not with feminism’s voice. Can an individual be sure
that her sympathy with feminism’s goals has not influenced
her assessments of items in the world to which the theory
applies? Can she be sure that in her interpretations she is not
projecting her feminist beliefs onto what she is interpreting,
rather than finding something internal to the words or works
that fits with feminist beliefs? Kant, for one, has said no.
This is a danger faced by anyone who believes anything: that
you deceive yourself into thinking you are not projecting onto
what is to be interpreted something that is merely external to
it, when in truth you are projecting onto it something that
could not be discovered just through scrutiny of the word or
deed in need of interpretation. There is nothing for this, and
here I think of Kant’s speaking to the difficulty of knowing
whether you are performing an act out of duty or interest:
you cannot know for sure because no matter how deep down
into yourself you look, there is always the chance that you will
come upon the dear self with all its interests. What Stern calls
private conditions are the beliefs and desires that contribute to
an individual’s being who she is and inflect her understanding
of what is at issue in the matter under interpretation. The
beliefs might be well-evidenced and shared by many, as might
the desires, but it is the configuration of the desires together
with the individual’s history that links them uniquely to the
individual. Simply to project them onto the object under
interpretation is to obscure the object; better, it is to obscure
its meaning. We need not here worry the issue of the
distinction between what speeches and actions do mean and
what they could mean because both depend on what is, in
some sense, “there” in the words or the actions. And we can
say that what is there is that for which a case can be made,

where the best case yields the best interpretation. Stern is
unwavering in his claim that interpretation is necessary only
when one does not understand something said or done (where
the something said can be a theory and the something done a
work of art). His theory shares a problem that dogs any
theory of knowledge or of interpretation, namely, that of
knowing enough about what is not yet known or interpreted to
be able to start on the way to knowing or interpreting it. But
this only means that there might be some actions or speechacts that an interpreter can never understand.
Individual voices are to be distinguished from borrowed or
group voices, which merely mouth what another individual or
group says. When someone speaks with her own voice, she
need not be saying what no one else says. She need only be
saying what comes from premises and principles that she has
worked through and to which she has committed herself, that
is, from the range of mental activities and attitudes that
constitute her mental world. One can be engaged in
interpretive reasoning only if her voice is her own and not her
neighbor’s or her groups. Let the interpreter speak in her own
voice and not a borrowed one, and let the object of her
interpretation be itself and not a mere projection of her
memories and desires, beliefs and doubts, longings and
dreams. Then the object of interpretation will have been
allowed to be itself, the interpreter will have expressed herself
in the making of it, and in Bishop Butler’s words “each thing
will have been shown to be what it is and not another thing.”
2. When Words Don’t Convey
One focus of the book is the realm of motives, causes,
reasons, and intentions that come forward when we talk about
speakers and listeners. It is not, that is to say, only about
what speakers say or about grammatically well-formed
segments of language in general but about speech-acts, their
targeted listeners, and the contexts in which the words are
uttered. Early on Stern observes that interpretation of others’
words is called for only when a listener finds what another
says to conflict with the facts as she, the listener, knows
them. The interpreter’s job then is two-fold: one, to find out
what would have to be the case for what was said to make
sense; two, to discover how the speaker was wrong so that
the interpreter can figure out how to take what was said. The
possibilities are many. The speaker might have made a
mistake in one of the myriad ways one can get things wrong:
she was blind to the facts or she misperceived or misjudged
them because she was preoccupied or had a hidden agenda,
and so on. She might well have known what the facts were
but simply lied about them. She might have been wrong
about the facts in a deep-seated way that was not to be
corrected by having her error pointed out to her. That is to
say, she might have been self-deceived. Here, then, are three
ways a speaker can end up saying something that is not
obvious to her listener: by making an easily corrected
mistake, by knowingly lying to the listener, or by unknowingly
lying to herself. Where does interpreting come in? The
listener did not understand what was said because it does not
fit with what she accepts as the relevant facts.
As Stern lays it out, what is to be interpreted is not the

meaning of the utterance but its motive (a lie) or its cause
(the speaker’s error or self-deception). But surely these are
not the only kinds of cases in which a listener does not
understand what is said. An interpretation can be complicated
by taking into consideration, as sometimes the listener must,
the points of view of speaker and listener, the relevant
knowledge of each, and the context of the speech. Stern
himself introduced the first complication when he said that the
goal of interpretation is to come to understand what another
said “when we cannot grasp immediately what was said [or
done]. The interpreter cannot grasp it, because from his
viewpoint there is a gap between what was said and his
understanding of what was said.” (201-202) Notice that the
interpreter’s failure is to grasp what was said from his
viewpoint. This leaves open the possibility that he might grasp
it if he were to look at it from the speaker’s point of view.
Now as early as kindergarten, Stern says, the child learns that
when he is trying to understand others there are two
possibilities. One is that “if he were in their place in the
current situation, he would say what they have said—in this
case he interprets their words in the light of what he accepts
as facts, and he accepts as facts what their words propose.”
(Emphasis added.) The other possibility is that he would not
say what they said because he does not accept as facts what
their words propose. (7) Looking at what was said from the
speaker’s point of view is the same as the interpreter’s putting
himself in the speaker’s place, and this is what, Stern implies,
we naturally do in trying to understand another. It is a
plausible reconstruction of what we do.
Stern leaves it open as to whether it is as oneself that one is
to put oneself in the other’s place and adopt his viewpoint or
as the speaker. Even when speaker and interpreter are
equally knowledgeable and agree on the facts of the matter
under interpretation, it makes a difference which persona the
interpreter adopts when he assumes the place of the speaker.
Often enough we find ourselves thinking that if we were in the
circumstances of the one whose words we are interpreting, we
certainly would not say what the speaker said. Were we,
however, to put ourselves in the place of the speaker, as the
speaker and not as ourselves, we might well say what he said.
Suppose that as ourselves we would not say what the speaker
said, but as the speaker, we would. Suppose further that we
think if Susan and Mary and Harvey imagined they were in the
speaker’s place as themselves, they too would not say what
the speaker said. The longer the list of people we imagine in
the speaker’s place who would not say what the speaker did,
the shakier becomes our understanding of what the speaker
said and the less sense it seems to make. What if the
condition for understanding were: no interpretation is needed
of a speaker’s words if they are “what anyone would say were
he in the speaker’s place” rather than “what the interpreter
would say.”
Back to the question of when interpretation is called for.
Having said that it is when there is a gap between what was
said and the interpreter’s understanding of what was said,
Stern continues “guided by common sense, [the interpreter]
attributes reasons to the speaker’s or agent’s words or deeds.”
(202) Common sense is needed because interpretation is an

art, not a science. This is true, but quite often when a person
does not understand what another has said, it is because he
does not know enough. Knowledge is needed as well as
common sense. Suppose the speaker is a connoisseur of
wines, and his listener is not. When, then, the speaker
describes a wine as having structure and a musky flavor with
a hint of blackberry, the listener will not understand him. He
needs an interpretation, but it does not have to be one that he
has made. Were the listener to adopt the viewpoint of the
connoisseur, he would be in a position to take Stern’s test for
understanding another’s words: we can be said to understand
what the other said when it is what we would say were we in
his place. But knowing little about wine, the listener cannot
adopt the point of view of the expert, and he cannot know
what he would say were he in the wine expert’s place.
Sometimes, then, when one does not understand another’s
words, it is because the listener is ignorant, not because the
speaker is mistaken, lying, or self-deceived.
The test of understanding another’s words is characterized by
Stern in a second way: “All speakers and agents want us to
understand their words and deeds as they wish we should
understand them.” (202) (Emphasis added.) This is different
from their wanting us to understand their words and deeds as
they intend us to, which is the same as saying, simply, they
want us to understand the point of what they say or do. I
might be making too much of the word “wish,” but it lets me
describe a case in which the words uttered are not what need
interpreting. Suppose the speaker is a man trying to seduce a
woman and he says something perfectly ordinary in a tone of
voice and with expressive gestures that makes it seem as
though he is sharing some intimacy with her. Now if she
understands what he says as he wishes her to, she will
mistakenly think he is singling her out to be privy to
something he would not share with just anyone. He is not,
however. He is trying to gain her confidence so that he can
have his way with her. She will have misinterpreted his
speech-act, which consists in more than his uttering
commonplaces.
If, however, she finds the words discrepant with his intimate
and conspiratorial gestures and voice, she will find a gap
between what he says and does, on the one hand, and her
understanding of the words and their accompanying behavior,
on the other. Here common sense, guiding her to the reasons
for the speaker’s words and behavior, will enable her correctly
to interpret them. Among the ways a speaker can go wrong,
then, is by deliberately misleading his audience through a
failure of fit not between words and facts, but between words
and accompanying behavior. The examples of the wine expert
and the seducer show two things. First, sometimes when we
cannot immediately grasp what was said, it is because we do
not know enough. We cannot grasp it all unless we become
more or less as knowledgeable as the speaker. Second,
sometimes it is not the words themselves that are not
understood, but the intentions with which they are uttered.
More fully to draw out the complexity of interpretive reasoning
and to accommodate point of view, degree and kind of
knowledge, and distorting intentions, let us look again at
Stern’s characterization of the situation in which a listener

understands what was said to him if (and only if) it is what he
would say if he were in the speaker’s place in the current
situation. Since understanding is the goal of interpretation,
any test of the understanding made possible by an
interpretation is at the same time a test of the soundness of
the interpretation. We ask ourselves if we would accept this
condition on an interpretation: an interpretation of something
said is justified just in case it is what anyone suitably qualified
would say were he in the speaker’s place, where spelling out
what it is to be “suitably qualified” will involve both general
specifications and those particular to the interpretandum.
Notice that putting “anyone” in place of “the interpreter”
protects the interpretation from the interpreter’s projection
onto it of the configuration of his own mental attitudes, which
Stern is at pains to avoid.
3. Works of Art and Words of Others
The smoothness and elegance of Stern’s theory of interpretive
reasoning requires that the kind of reasoning a listener uses in
interpreting another’s words be the same as the reasoning he
uses in interpreting works of art. He says that the proper
understanding of an artwork includes the appreciation of it, but
that by itself does not make interpreting art different from
interpreting everyday speech and actions. To appreciate a
work is to value it for how it engages us and for what it lets us
see about the world and ourselves. A reliable sign that we
have understood a work, then, is our being touched, even
changed, by it. This is a sufficient, albeit not a necessary, sign
of having understood the work. One difference between works
of art and the words of others is that most artworks seem not
to be grasped immediately, as Stern says most speech is. He
has been at pains to give criteria for understanding what
another said, and we want to see if they apply to works of
art.
Let us go back to the kindergarten in which Stern began
Interpretive Reasoning. I quote in full: “In kindergarten the
novice has learned to distinguish between two possibilities
when understanding others. (1) If he were in their place in
the current situation, he would say what they have said. In
this case he interprets their words in the light of what he
accepts as facts, and he accepts as facts what their words
propose. (2) If he were in their place in the current situation,
he would not say what they have said. In this case he also
interprets their words in the light of what he accepts as facts,
but he does not accept as facts what is proposed by their
words.” (7) Counterpart to a speaker’s words is the painting’s
colors, lines, and shapes. What the painted colors, lines, and
shapes propose is that they represent, variously, teeth and a
mouth, an eye, hair, a dress, a curtain, an arm, a leg. The
facts are what the colored patches propose, namely, that on
the canvas of Willem de Kooning’s 1953 Woman is a picture of
a woman.
We have gone one step beyond accepting that the paint
patches composed teeth and lips, an eye and the rest. Just as
words have meanings and obey rules of formation to compose
sentences, so patches of paint represent items in the world like
eyes, legs, dresses that can be ordered so as to compose a
picture of a woman. Following Stern, de Kooning’s viewer

performs an experiment in imagination: she imagines that she
is in de Kooning’s place and asks herself what de Kooning has
painted. Since the voices of good artists are their own, we do
not ask whether the viewer should put herself in de Kooning’s
place as herself or as the artist. What the artist did is
idiosyncratic to him; we have no interest in what the viewer
would have done had she stood, brush in hand, in front of his
canvas. We ask the viewer to imagine that she is de Kooning
and to ask if she intended the colored shapes and lines she put
on the canvas represent a woman. Well, yes. It is clear
enough that it is a woman. Remember, what we want to know
is whether the viewer understands the painting, and we have
said, following Stern on interpreting in general, that she does
if, were she in his place, she would have done as he did. That
is, given the assignment de Kooning set himself, which she
must figure out by scrutiny of the painting, would the viewer
have painted this woman. Would she have laid the paint as de
Kooning did, in strokes broad, quick, and jagged. Would she
have repeated teeth and eye on the woman’s chest? Would
she have the woman grimace so? I think the nature of
creativity and of the individual voice is such that a viewer’s
asking herself what she would have done had she been in the
artist’s place allows only “I have no idea.” Here is where
interpreting what other people do and say in the ordinary
course of things and interpreting what artists and philosophers
do and say in the practice of art and philosophy part ways.
Better than asking the viewer to imagine herself in de
Kooning’s place is to ask what intentions the painting seems to
her to fulfill and whether they are such that she can imagine
anyone (anyone at all?) having them. The viewer has to make
a case for the sets of intentions the painting seems to her to
fulfill. Stern would say that the set for which the best case
can be made is the best interpretation of the work. Given
different evaluative criteria, different interpretations might
count as the best. Stern should be able to accept this since
his account of interpretive reasoning does not shy away from
evaluation, as it does not shy away from articulating rules for
the moral conduct of the activity of interpreting.
The possibility of gaps between what an artwork says and
what the viewer hears, between what the painter paints and
what the viewer would paint were she in his place (as the
creator of that work, not as herself) can at times keep us from
seeing what it is that calls for interpretation. Because of this,
the matter of determining the conditions under which art
interpretations are necessary and the conditions they must
satisfy to be justified is more complex than might at first
appear. And the borders between interpretive reasoning and
understanding, between understanding and appreciating,
between appreciating and engaging are more porous than
Stern’s characterizations allow. This is so for interpreting the
words of others as well as works of art, but the toll it takes on
interpreting works of art and philosophy is greater than its toll
on ordinary words and actions. Interpretive reasoning is like
dancing in that it engages the whole person. Throughout this
book, whose gamut runs from the singularity of the individual
voice to the universality of what any rational man and woman
would understand an agent to be doing or saying in given
circumstances, Laurent Stern is wholly engaged in this
enterprise in which he asks when we should and when we

must intrude on (interpret) the acts of others in order for us
properly to engage them. The reader stands only to gain when
she agrees to dance with him.
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